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In Edward McClennen's rich paper, I want chiefly to talk about neutral 
equilibria: situations in which each person's strategy --  usually mixed --  
is a best response to the other's, but not the only best response. In 
many games (in the game-theoretic sense), a neutral equilibrium with 
mixed strategies is the only equilibrium there is. This is strange, 
McClennen and I both think. A mixed strategy is rational, the standard 
theory tells us. By expected utility reasoning, then, any of the moves 
this mixed strategy gives you any chance of making is rational. More- 
over, any other lottery among these moves is rational. Yet the theory 
picks out a unique mixed strategy, and tells you to adopt it. 
In these cases, your equilibrium strategy is the only strategy that is 
self-ratifying, in the sense that if you know that it is the strategy you are 
adopting, then you will rationally think that it is the strategy that holds 
out best prospects. But it is only weakly self-ratifying: If you adopt it, 
you won't think it is the unique strategy that holds out best prospects. It 
recommends itself, but it recommends alternative strategies too. Adopt-  
ing your equilibrium strategy, you will think that these alternative 
strategies hold out equally good prospects. But these alternative strate- 
gies are not self-ratifying: for any of them, if you had known that it was 
the strategy you were adopting, then you would not have thought it held 
out best prospects. Only one strategy recommends itself, but it recom- 
mends other strategies equally. The strategy is uniquely but weakly self- 
ratifying} 
In the case of two person zero sum games, games were one player's 
gain is another's equal loss, McClennen thinks the standard game 
theorists' solution is correct for all its strangeness, but that it cannot be 
supported by expected utility reasoning, the kind of reasoning that 
applies to games against nature. Now I keep agreeing that there is 
something strange about neutral equilibria, and I'll be saying more 
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about this strangeness at the end of my remarks, without resolving the 
matter. 
McClennen, though, draws a grand moral that I don't think is 
justified. He thinks there is a fundamental difference between games 
against nature and games against other rational agents. One, he says, 
calls for "parametric rationality" --  taking the parameters of one's 
situation as given. The other calls for strategic rationality. I want to say 
this is wrong. What gives rise to uniquely but weakly self-ratifying 
strategies is not, necessarily, that one is playing against a rational agent. 
It is that which strategy one adopts is evidentially significant. In the case 
of a game, what one does serves as evidence for what one's opponent is 
expecting one to do. But this is not the only way one's strategy can 
indicate one's environment. 
The story I will tell to illustrate this point is far-fetched, but my point 
is a theoretical one, and so a far-fetched story will do. Imagine this: 
Smoking, it turns out, does cause cancer, but only in people with a 
certain gene. This gene, indeed, has two effects: First, as I said, it makes 
one susceptible to smoking's causing cancer. Second, though, it makes 
one reckless in situations precisely like this, so that in this situation, if 
one enjoys smoking, one will smoke despite the danger. Knowing all 
this, the question is, what is it rational to do if you somewhat enjoy 
smoking, and very much don't want to get cancer? 2 If you recklessly 
smoke, that indicates you have the gene, so that with you, smoking 
causes cancer. If you cautiously refrain from smoking, that indicates 
you don't have the gene, so that you could enjoy smoking and still not 
get cancer. 
You might adopt a mixed strategy, and give yourself some inter- 
mediate chance of smoking. For this case, we have to elaborate the 
story. Imagine in addition, that the more reckless you are -- the higher 
a chance you give yourself of smoking -- the more likely you are to 
have the gene. Suppose the probability of having the gene is a con- 
tinuous function of how recklessly you gamble. Then there will be a 
probability of smoking such that, if you know that it is the probability 
you are adopting, the prospects you rationally envisage are equal 
whether you smoke or not. This strategy is self-ratifying, but only 
weakly. It recommends itself, but equally recommends any other prob- 
ability mixture of smoking or not smoking. 
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The big divide, then, is not between games against nature and games 
against rational agents. The peculiarities come when one's choice 
strategy gives evidence about features of the environment that one's 
actions cannot affect. Then strange things can arise, including the 
existence of a uniquely but weakly self-ratifying strategy. 
1. TWO KINDS OF CONDITIONALS 
McClennen has another argument against standard treatments of game 
theory, an argument that does not rely on the strange features of 
uniquely but weakly self-ratifying strategies. He discredits an assump- 
tion required for the standard arguments in game theory, by arguing 
that this assumption would allow an equally good argument for a choice 
rule that is ridiculous: to evaluate each strategy by asking how good 
things would be if that were the strategy your opponent correctly 
foresaw you adopting. Act, in other words, as if you were to choose 
your strategy first, and then your opponent, observing your strategy, 
would respond. McClennen and I agree that this way of thinking is 
defective. It has you acting as if you were choosing first, when in fact 
you aren't. In a game of chicken, if both parties think this way, they die 
in a head-on crash. 
McClennen, though, thinks the manifest folly of this way of thinking 
discredits the standard assumptions of game theory. The assumption he 
attacks is this: that you the rational player are convinced, throughout 
your reasoning, that when you finally conclude what it is rational to do, 
your opponent will have foreseen your conclusion, and already expect 
you to do it. You expect that the other player has "psyched you out." 
Call this the Mutual Predictability Assumption. McClennen claims that 
from this assumption would follow the ridiculous decision rule of 
acting, in a simultaneous game, as if you are moving first -- and so the 
assumption must be untenable. 
I shall argue that Mutual Predictability has no such consequence. To 
see this, we must understand exactly what Mutual Predictability says, 
and it will help if we review its rationale. An early point in your 
reasoning, you think there is a fully convincing theory of how to play 
the game rationally, and that you will follow the theory and your 
opponent will expect you to. At this point in your reasoning, though, 
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you don't know what the theory is. You thus think you will choose 
using the right theory, once you have figured out what that theory is, 
and that your opponent too will figure out the right theory and 
anticipate your using it. You think, therefore, that when you have 
decided what to do, your opponent will already be expecting it, and 
respond rationally to the move he predicts you will be making. 
The rationale supports this thought, but not another with which it 
might be confused. Here is something you cannot reasonably think: 
That no matter what you might do, if you were to do it, your opponent 
would anticipate it. The confusion stems from two readings of the 
conditional, "If I adopt strategy A, then A is the strategy my opponent 
will expect me to adopt." First, there is the epistemic reading, on which 
it may be a perfectly reasonable thing to accept. "If I'm going to do A, 
then he expects me to do A." Fully convinced that I will do whatever is 
rational, and that he knows what is rational and expects me to do it, 
and unsure whether A or something else is the rational thing to do, I 
am set, on learning I will do A, to think he expects me to do A. The 
unacceptable reading is the subjunctive one: "If I were to do A, then A 
would be what he expects me to do." I don't know whether A is the 
rational thing to do. If something else -- B, let us say --  is the rational 
thing to do, he anticipates my doing B. Thus if I were to do A, then he 
would get me wrong. 
Now Robert Stalnaker discovered that subjunctive conditionals have 
a special role in rational decision. The point has been controversial, but 
William Harper and I are among the people who think this is a genuine 
discovery -- and even fairly obvious, once one thinks about it enough. 
It counts against an act that if I were to do it, something bad would 
ensue, and in favor of the act that if I were to do it, something good 
would ensue. 3 
Let me illustrate the distinction with a parallel decision problem, 
where again a conditional can be given either of these two kinds of 
readings, and confusing the two could lead to folly. I am good at 
arithmetic: I think slowly, but when I come to an answer, the answer is 
right. I have won two prizes, worth $58 and $67. I can collect my prize 
only if I answer correctly what I am owed. I am to answer on a multiple 
choice test; possible answers Sl10,  Sl15,  S120, $125, $130. Now 
knowing I am good at arithmetic, I think, epistemically, that if I'm going 
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to conclude the sum is $130, then that is the right answer, and S130 is 
what I will get. Likewise, if I 'm going to conclude that the sum is S125, 
then $125 is what I will get. These epistemic conditionals are fine. What 
I cannot reasonably do is go on to reason like this: I prefer $130 to 
$125, and since if I 'm going to mark S130 on the test, then that is what 
the sum is, it follows that I do better to mark $130. To reason this way 
is to endorse wishful thinking. The epistemic conditional is the wrong 
one to use. Rather, I must guide myself by subjunctive conditionals. But 
I don't  think, subjunctively, that if I were to mark S130 on the test, the 
sum would really be S130, so that S130 is what I would get. For  all I 
know so far, the sum isn't $130, and if it isn't, then if I were to conclude 
that the sum is S130, I would get nothing. 
Things go likewise in the game-theoretic case. I can reasonably 
accept an epistemic conditional. I 'm convinced that I 'm rational, and 
that he knows it, and that he too will have figured out what is rational. 
So I accept this: "If I am going to choose A then he expects me to 
choose A." I can't use this, though, as a reason for choosing whatever 
I'd most like him to correctly believe I was choosing. That  would 
endorse driving straight on in a game of chicken. What matters directly 
for decision is whether I accept this subjunctive conditional: "If I were 
to drive straight on for sure, he would expect me to do so --  and so 
would swerve." If I were reasonably convinced of this, I could reason- 
ably drive straight on for sure, knowing he would swerve. But I can't 
reasonably be convinced of this - -  for I haven't yet concluded whether 
driving straight on is the rational thing to do. At that point, I know only 
that i f  it is the rational thing to do, then he expects me to do it. Thus if 
it is what I am going to do, then it is what he expects me to do. But it 
doesn't follow that were I to do it, that is what he would have expected 
me to do --  that would be a silly thing to accept. 
Now to my eye, McClennen's "Maxilor Condition", as he states it, 
gets an epistemic reading. It reads to me as a plausible condition, and 
one that could not be used to support acting, in a simultaneous game, 
as if one were moving first. Its upshot is that one's strategy must be a 
best response to one's opponent 's  best response. It does not say that 
one's strategy must be best on the false assumption that no matter what 
strategy one were to choose, one's opponent  would give a best response 
to it. Yet this last is what constitutes acting as if one were moving first, 
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and one's opponent  were going to observe one's move and give a best 
response. This last is the rule that tells both  drivers in a game of 
chicken to drive straight on - -  and so to crash. 
The standard requirement on a rational strategy X is this: 
X must do at least as well against the best reply to X as any 
alternative Y does against the best response to X. 
This is different f rom the silly requirement that produces a head-on 
crash in the game of chicken: 
X must  do at least as well against the best reply to X as any 
alternative Y does against the best response to Y. 
The silly requirement does not follow f rom the standard requirement. I 
read the "Maxilor Condition", as McClennen states it, as yielding the 
standard requirement,  not the silly one. 
Now the standard argument in game theory uses the right kind of 
conditionals in the right way. It uses an epistemic conditional, and it 
uses it correctly: to drive an indirect argument, not to say what would 
happen if one acted one way or another. H o w  do we rule out a pure 
strategy? I say, "If A is rational for me, then he knows that A is rational 
for me, and he is going to give his best response to that. But A is not 
my best response to this, and so A is not rational." This uses only well 
founded epistemic conditionals. It nowhere assumes the fallacious 
subjunctive claim, that if I were to do A, he would give his best 
response to A. But it is this subjunctive kind of conditional that is 
needed to drive the crazy maxilor argument. 
2. STRANGE EQUILIBRIA 
What  do I want to say, then, about the puzzle of a uniquely but weakly 
self-ratifying equilibrium? I 'm not at all sure what to say, especially in 
the smoking case. There, the unsatisfactory way of reasoning I have 
been sketching seems forced on us. The only way out I can see is this: 
Could it be that there is no ideally rational thing to do in the circum- 
stance? However  rational one is, we can argue, one needs to be more  
rational. A more  rational being, after all, could look at you, conclude 
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what you are disposed to do, deduce from that what your genetic 
makeup is, and act accordingly. You yourself are not guileful enough to 
do so. 
In Ghana, girls play a game called ampeh. Clapping their hands 
twice, each girl jumps first on two feet and then on one foot. One girl 
tries to match the foot the other girl jumps on; the other tries to avoid 
being matched. Now imagine two robots programmed to play ampeh --  
though doubtless, without the grace and exuberance of young girls at 
play. The robots are transparent, in the sense that each can "see" the 
other's program. Then we know that at least one program is incapable 
of predicting which foot the other will choose --  or at least, to do so 
long enough before the second clap to respond optimally. For  call the 
programs Amma and Akua, and suppose Aroma is trying for a match 
and Akua for a non-match. If Aroma could predict Akua in time, she 
would match. If Akua could predict Amma in time, she would mis- 
match. So it can't be the case both that Amma can predict Akua in time 
and Akua can predict Amma in time. Yet each has full information 
about the other: they are transparent. What must be happening is that at 
least one of them is insufficiently powerful a reasoner to figure out the 
other on time, even given a full view of the other's workings. A suffi- 
cient powerful algorithm could predict them both --  and so the moral 
is, there is no such conceivable thing as an ideally powerful algorithm. 
For  every possible algorithm, there is a more powerful one. 4 
All this is for algorithms that cannot randomize. They can pseudo- 
randomize: they can perform determinate calculations that pretty well 
mimic randomization. But in one way, they do not mimic true random- 
ization: a sufficiently powerful observer could predict the outcome of 
the process. 
Now we had thought that with true randomization, we weren't forced 
to the conclusion that there is no such thing as ideal rationality. Or at 
least, it seemed we could think that for a given problem, there is such a 
thing as being rational enough --  being a powerful enough calculator - -  
no matter what one's opponent  is like. The same thing seems to go for 
algorithms that use opaque pseudo-randomizers: who are able to keep 
each other ignorant of the calculations they use for pseudo-randomiza- 
tion. We should find these results striking and surprising. And indeed, 
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faced with the paradox of a uniquely but weakly self-ratifying strategy, 
perhaps we should say, these results turned out to be too good to be 
true. 
In the game-theoretic case, though, I'm not sure we are forced to this 
conclusion -- and this for reasons McClennen gives. The crucial as- 
sumption is one of determinateness: that from one's situation and one's 
rationality, it follows what one's strategy will be. There seems to be no 
reason to accept this assumption. Why shouldn't the correct theory of 
rationality endorse more than one choice as equally rational? In that 
case, your opponent may know your situation, know that you are 
rational, and know what the correct theory of rationality says about our 
situation -- and still not know what you will do. That is to say, he may 
not only not know what you will end up doing, but -- even what prob- 
abilities you will give yourself of doing various different things. 
How, then, would we get a mixed strategy equilibrium? It might not 
be that any one player adopts the mixed strategy that game theory 
recommends. It might even be that each adopts a pure strategy, but that 
neither player knows which pure strategy the other is adopting. Let 
Dick and Jane engage in a zero sum game with mixed strategies in 
equilibrium. What matters for this equilibrium is that Dick have the 
right subjective probabilities for what Jane will do, not that these be the 
actual probabilities with which she will do these things. The same 
applies, of course, to Jane psyching out Dick. Dick and Jane may even 
be incapable of randomizing, and know it. But for Dick to have the 
right subjective probabilities for what Jane will do, all we need is that 
Dick doesn't know if he is facing a Jane type 1 who will do act A, or a 
Jane type 2 who will do act B. 
I don't know how to work out a theory of this kind so as to be fully 
satisfactory. But it does have a virtue: It does not issue in the strange 
requirement that in a situation in which Jane finds acts A and B to 
offer equal prospects, she must, to be rational, choose some particular 
probability mixture of the two. It allows that any probability mixture 
would be equally rational --  even A for sure or B for sure. 
It might be, then, that game theory is an easier nut to crack, helping 
ourselves to the standard assumptions of parametric rationality, than is 
the smoking example I gave -- though the smoking example is a game 
against nature. The big divide in the theory of instrumental rationality is 
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not  b e t w e e n  games  agains t  ra t iona l  p l aye r s  and  games  agains t  na ture ,  
bu t  b e t w e e n  act ions  that  a re  d iagnos t ic  of  one ' s  e n v i r o n m e n t  and  
act ions  that  a re  not.  M o r e  prec ise ly ,  the  t r icky cases  a re  ones  in which  
one ' s  ac t ion  will  give one  ev idence  abou t  fea tures  of  one ' s  e n v i r o n m e n t  
the  ac t ion  canno t  affect. G a m e  theo ry  has  s t range  fea tures  b e c a u s e  its 
s t a n d a r d  assumpt ions ,  seemingly  well  f ounded ,  give r ise to cases  o f  this 
sort.  
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